2013年5月15日 星期三

已開發與開發中國家漁業合作的爭論~~

已開發與開發中國家漁業合作的爭論~~

文章日期:2013-05-14 11:48
Gagern, A. and J. van den Bergh (2013). "A critical review of fishing agreements with tropical developing countries." Marine Policy 38(0): 375-386.
心得
-從魚線的盡頭開始,就有不少聲音質疑雙邊漁業合作的模式,美其名能夠充分利用海洋資源、也提供開發中國家經濟資助。
-此篇文章作者(來自歐洲西班牙等國的環保團體)認為許多漁業協定中的遠洋漁業國家已經越來越不負責任(這是在說誰呢),對於資源傷害日增,而沿岸國受益有限!
-這些文章裡面多少會提到台灣,但因為資訊不充分,往往顯得片段
 ==>我們真的應該好好寫篇有關台灣遠洋漁業雙邊多邊合作的"貢獻"~
Abstract
 Many African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries sell fishing licenses to distant water fleets. Fishing agreements have the potential to improve the performance of local fishing sectors. They create income that can be reinvested into domestic industries and often go along with partnerships in management and enforcement. However, many fishing agreements run a serious risk of undermining sustainable resource management. The present study critically reviews trends in distant water fishing as well as identifies those tropical host countries most dependent on fishing agreements. It is shown that traditional, more responsible distant water fleets (DWFs) are being displaced by less responsible, low-cost DWFs and that the most vulnerable host countries are small coastal states with large exclusive economic zones that lack the ability to benefit from value adding processes associated with fishing. The results suggest that the once-promising concept of fishing agreements is gradually posing a threat to both economic development and environmental sustainability of ACP countries.


太平洋島國絕對不是省油的燈

文章日期:2013-05-14 12:11
Havice, E. and K. Reed (2012). "Fishing for Development? Tuna Resource Access and Industrial Change in Papua New Guinea." Journal of Agrarian Change 12(2-3): 413-435.

心得
  PNG(巴布亞紐新幾內亞,業者又稱之巴新,可不是巴西),是在國內"赫赫有名"的太平洋島國,早期台灣圍網船(還有其他國家)付費入漁,彼此各取所需,相安無事。
 近來,PNG不再只要"魚",更想擁有釣竿,這下子開始要求投資罐頭廠、使用當地勞工,於是,重新改寫漁業合作的模式,
   未來將如何發展呢?to be continued.
Abstract
 Papua New Guinea (PNG) is an island state with sovereign rights over valuable tuna resources. Historically, PNG captured value from tuna only by charging licensing fees to foreign fishing fleets, which relegated PNG as a source of raw material for the global tuna industry. To capture more value from tuna – including much-needed jobs and infrastructure – the PNG government now offers firms that invest in domestic tuna processing plants strategic, long-term fishing licences. This strategy of ‘obligating embeddedness’ enables PNG to reorder the international division of labour in the canned tuna sector, but socio-economic outcomes are shaped by competition within the global tuna industry, the core business strategies of foreign firms and domestic conditions in PNG. Ultimately, a state's right to control the terms of access to tuna is not synonymous with its ability to shape the local-level consequences that emerge as firms comply. These findings reveal the peculiar nature of state sovereignty over pelagic marine resources and the complications of exploiting them to achieve domestic economic and social objectives.